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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED 

"CLOSED RECORD" ADMINISTRATIVE 

LAW JUDGE HEARING IN THE 

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 

PROGRAM 

FRANK R. LINDH· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 12, 1983, President Reagan approved legislation l 
containing several provisions designed to improve the process 
whereby the Social Security Administration (SSA) conducts reviews 
of disability cases for continuing medical eligibility.2 Among these 
• Executive Assistant to the Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals. 
Social Security Administration. M.S.W., University of North Carolina, 1980; candidate 
for J.D. degree, GeorgetoWD University Law Center, 1985. 
This article represents the author's personal views and no official suppon or en­
dorsement by the Social Security Administration or the Depanment of Health and 
Human Services is intended or should be inferred. 
The author is indebted to Mr. Frederick W. Amer. Professional Staff (Retired). So­
cial Security Subcommittee, House Committee on Ways and Means. and Professor War­
ren F. Schwartz, GeorgetoWD University Law Center. for their comments on an earlier 
draft. and to Louis B. Hays, former Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals. 
Social Security Administration, for his exceptional insight into many of the issues dis­
cussed in the article. 
1. Act of Jan. 12, 1983. Pub. L. No. 97-455, §§ 2-6. 96 Stat. 2497. 2498-2501 (codi­
fied at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Act of Jan. 12). 
2. Under the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-265. 
94 Stat. 441, 460 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafier cited as Amend­
ments of 1980), the Social Security Administration is required to review all such cases in 
which the beneficiary bas a non-permanent impairment at least once every three years. 
This requirement grew out of concerns in the mid-1970's that the rapid growth of the 
disability program under title II of the Social Security Act was depleting the Social Se­
curity Disability Trust Fund, and was fueled by reports by the Government Accounting 
Office and others that large numbers of disability beneficiaries were remaining on the 
rolls cven after their medical impairments had ceased or were no longer disabling. As a 
result of the 1980 amendments, unprecedented numbers of continuing disability reviews 
were initiated by SSA beginning in 1981 and a great many beneficiaries were informed 
that they were no longer eligible for disability benefits. Newspaper accounts told of ben­
eficiaries terminated because they were no longer disabled who later died of their ail­
ments, and other beneficiaries who commmitted suicide upon receiving their termination 
notices. Meanwhile. those who appealed their terminations were restored to the rolls in 
upwards of sixty percent of the cases by the administrative law judges. although they 
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was a requirement for "evidentiary hearings in reconsiderations of 
disability benefit terminations" beginning "not later than January 1, 
1984."3 The President noted that a new hearing will enhance the 
beneficiary's opportunity to present his or her case, and will give 
program officials an additional source of information about the ben­
eficiary's present medical condition.4 
The House-Senate Conferees on this legislation were careful to 
note that the new requirement for an evidentiary hearing at the re­
consideration level in disability termination cases would not change 
the requirement of existing law for a hearing before an administra­
tive law judge.s But Chairman J.J. Pickle of the House Subcommit­
tee on Social Security, in his remarks on the floor of the House 
shortly before the Conference Report was approved by that body, 
cautioned that, with over 155,000 cases "stacked up now waiting" for 
administrative law judge hearings, it was imperative to consider 
changes in the adjudicatory process.6 "Next year that is one of the 
were forced to endure many months without benefit payments during the lenghty appeal 
period. For an account of the problems generated by these reviews, sec Oversight 0/ 
Social Security Disability Benefits Terminations, Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee 
on OverSight 0/Government Management ofthe Committee on Governmental Affairs 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); and CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, IM­
PACT OF THE ACCELERATED REVIEW PROCESS ON CESSATIONS AND DENIALS IN THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 
1982) It was in response to the public outcry over these terminations that the provisions 
of Act of Jan. 12, supra note I, were enacted, their stated purpose being to ameliorate the 
worst effccts of the massive review of the disability rolls undertaken pursuant to the 1980 
amendments. Besides the face-ta-face reconsideration hearings, Act of Jan. 12, supra 
note I, also gave disability beneficiaries who were appealing a termination of benefits the 
option of continuing to receive benefit payments until the issuance of an administrative 
law judge hearing decision, and authorized the Sccretary to limit the number of cases 
reviewed in those state agencies that were having workload difficulties. 
3. Section 44 of Act of Jan. 12, supra note I, amends section 205(b) of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981). 
4. President's statement on signing H.R. 7093 into law, 19 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. 
Doc. 39 (Jan. 12, 1983). 
5. H.R. REP. No. 285, 97th Code Cong., 2d Sess., II, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE 
CONGo &: AD. NEWS 4373, 4401. The "existing law" referred to in the Conference Report 
is contained in Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act, which follows: 
The Secretary [of Health and Human Services) is directed to make fiildings 
of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for a payment 
under this subchapter. . .. Upon request by any such individual. . . ,he shall 
give such applicant . . . reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with 
respect to such decision, and, ifa hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence 
adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse his fiildings of fact and such 
decision. 
42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
6. 128 CONGo REc. HI0678 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982) (statement of Chairman 
Pickle). As of October I, 1983, the pending administrative law judge caseload in SSA 
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challenges we face," he said.7 
In addition to this backlog of pending hearing requests, Chair­
man Pickle also drew his colleagues' attention to the problem of in­
consistent standards of adjudication within SSA. He noted that 
uniformity of standards was needed between the State agency and 
admjnistrative law judge hearing levels, "so that we are judging the 
cases by the same rule book. "8 
Mr. Pickle's remarks on the bill enacted in early 1983 reflect 
concerns expressed by his subcommittee throughout the latter half of 
the 1970's.9 A 1978 study of the Social Security hearings and ap­
peals process undertaken by the National Center for Administrative 
Justice (CAJ)lO under contract with SSA, and at the urging of the 
Pickle Subcommittee, found "three major concerns" reflected in the 
relevant committee hearings and reports. These were, first, "the 
backlog of cases and the corresponding inability of the current sys­
tem to handle increasing numbers of appeals"; second, ''the increas­
ing frequency with which [administrative law judges] reversed the 
decisions of the state agencies who make initial and reconsideraton 
decisions in disability cases"; and, third, ''the substantial variance in 
the reversal rates of [administrative law judges]."l1 
One question which naturally arises from the enactment of a 
new "evidentiary hearing" requirement at the pre-administrative law 
judge hearing stage is how this new procedure might help to resolve 
the three longstanding problems of delay, high reversal rates, and 
inconsistency among individual administrative law judges in the ex­
isting Social Security appeals process. Jerry L. Mashaw (who 
headed the CAJ study group), suggests in his recent book, Bureau-
bad increased to 173,431 cases. SSA, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Operational Re­
port (Sept. 30, 1983) (SSA Pub. No. 70-032 (1-84» [hereinafter cited as OHA OPERA­
TIONAL REPORT, FY 1983). The average time between the tiling of a request for a 
hearing and the issuance of a hearing decision was in excess of 180 days. SSA, OFFICE 
OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS (Dec. 1983) (mimeo) [herein­
after cited as KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS). 
7. 128 CONGo REc. HI0678 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982) (statement of Chairman 
Pickle). 
8. Id. 
9. See, e.g., Delays in Social Security Appeals: Hearings Before tlte Subcommillee on 
Social Security oftlte Committee on Ways omJ Means 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [herein­
after cited as Delays in Social Security Appeals: 1975 Hearings); STAFF OF THE SUB­
COMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER, May 
17, 1976 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE isSUE PAPER, 1976). 
10. J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ & P. VERKUIL, SOCIAL 
SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA­
TION HEARING SYSTEM (1978) [hereinafter cited as CAl STUDY REPORT). 
II. Id. at 1-3. 
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erotic Justice, 12 that a number of improvements might be expected to 
flow from an informal, face-to-face hearing at the reconsideration 
level. He noted, first, that claimants would be more satisfied when 
allowed to present their appeals personally, and that the immediacy 
of the face-to-face encounter with a decisionmaker would increase 
the perceived fairness of the process. Second, the decisionmaker 
would also benefit from the additional information gleaned directly 
from the claimant. This need not require a loss of appropriate objec­
tivity, Mashaw noted, but would simply add a human dimension to 
what had been a mere claims folder review. As a result, Mashaw 
anticipated that the reconsideration decision would be strengthened 
and hence "more likely to stand up on appeal."13 
Interestingly, the first House bill to contain a face-to-face hear­
ing requirement for the reconsideration level would have also re­
quired that the evidentiary record be closed to the admission of new 
evidence at the subsequent levels of the appeals process. 14 This 
would mean, then, that the administrative law judge hearing and re­
sulting decision would be limited in scope to the record as it was 
developed below, in any case in which a dissatisfied claimant, fol­
lowing the lower-level hearing, appealed the reconsideration deci­
sion to the next level. This "closed record" requirement was not, 
however, included in the legislation signed by the President in early 
1983. 
It would seem worthwhile not only to examine the three 
problems cited by the CAl six years ago in light of current workload 
trends, but also to consider, first, the likely effects of the new lower­
level hearing on the overall disability appeals process, and, second, 
how the "closed record" concept, originally linked to the require­
ment for a lower-level hearing, might further contribute to this 
improvement. 
The CAl, in its final study report, suggested that the results of 
the study might help ''to refine prior appreciation of the trade-offs 
involved in pursuing any particular goal," such as the timeliness or 
consistency of decision-making. "Criticism of the present system," 
the authors pointed out, "often focuses on one of its failings, such as 
the backlog of cases, with no apparent understanding that (some rad­
12. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABIL­
ITY CLAIMS (1983) [hereinafter cited as MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE]. 
13. Id at 199. 
14. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, DISABILITY AMENDMENTS OF 1982, 
H.R. REP. No. 588, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (to accompany H.R. 6181) [hereinafter 
cited as DISABILITY AMENDMENTS]. 
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ical breakthrough in technology aside) material improvement in this 
regard can only be achieved by paying a price-either more re­
sources for handling these cases or a lesser accomplishment of other 
relevant ends, such as the accuracy, consistency, and perceived fair­
ness of the system."IS The authors' major conclusion was that any 
"new procedure that serves one or more of the ends of the system­
yielding faster and more accurate decisions-and disserves none of 
its other ends-as for example, entailing no loss of perceived fairness 
by claimants and requiring no additional outlays-is as rare as it is 
desirable."16 
This observation suggests the need for a cautious approach to 
analysis of problems and solutions in an adjudicatory system of such 
magnitude and complexity. Any proposal or-in the case of the new 
reconsideration hearings-actual change in law designed to improve 
the SSA hearings and appeals process, must be considered in the 
context of the overall system. As the CAJ observed, there is "no 
doubt that the interrelationships among the many functions that 
comprise this system are so subtle and complex that facile general­
ization about what will happen to everything else if one feature is 
changed is impossible."I' 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS 

AND APPEALS PROCESS 

In fiscal year 1983,18 ninety-seven percent of the administrative 
law judge hearing requests processed by SSA's Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (OHA) arose in disability cases under titles II and XVI 
of the Social Security Act. 19 It is therefore customary for profes­
sional staff at OHA as well as congressional and other outside stu­
15. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. 
16. Id at 11-12. 
17. Id at xix-xx. 
18. The federal fiscal year runs from October I through September 30. Thus, fiscal 
year 1983 consists of the period of October I, 1982 through September 30, 1983. 
19. OHA OPERATIONAL REPORT, FY 1983, supra note 6. Title II of the Social 
Security Act is the basic insurance program which includes, inte,. alia, Retirement and 
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance. Title XVI is the Supplemental Security 
(SSI) program for the Aged, Blind and Disabled, a needs-based program. The disability 
requirements under titles II and XVI are identical. Thus, a title II claim initially requires 
a determination of insured status whereas a title XVI claim requires a determination of 
whether the claimant's income and resources are within statutory limits, but once these 
threshold determinations are resolved in favor of the claimant, the substantive medical­
vocational determination of disability is essentially the same for both types of claims. 
Special rules, not relevant here, apply to disabled children and disabled surviving 
spouses. 
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dents of the process to equate the administrative law judge hearing 
process with the disability appeals process. This paper follows that 
general custom. 
The adjudication of a claim for disability benefits begins with 
the filing of an application by the claimant at a local Social Security 
office. The medical-vocational aspects of the initial determination 
are made in most cases by a State Disability Determination Services 
agency.20 If the claimant is dissatisfied with the results of the state 
agency's initial determination, he or she may request reconsidera­
tion.2t Prior to the enactment of the new requirement for a face-to­
face hearing at the reconsideration level in disability termination 
cases, the reconsideration process "consist[ed] solely of a review of 
documentary evidence in the case file by [the state agency's] physi­
cians and staff; the claimant or beneficiary who appeal[ed] an initial 
determination [did] not actually meet with a decisionmaker until the 
[administrative law judge] hearing level."22 
At the administrative law judge hearing level, the claimant's 
case is reviewed and the evidence brought up to date, and the claim­
ant is given an opportunity for a hearing before an administrative 
law judge appointed under the Administrative Procedure Act.23 If 
20. The rules governing the relationship of these state agencies with SSA may be 
found at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 Q (1983) (title II cases); and id. pI. 416 J (for title XVI cases). 
21. The rules governing requests for administrative review-including reconsider­
ation, administrative law judge hearings and Appeals Council review-may be found at 
20 C.F.R. pI. 404 J (for title II cases); and iti. pI. 416 N (for title XVI cases). The recon­
sideration process, it should be noted, was created by regulation, not by the Social Secur­
ity Act itself. For an account of its origins and an analysis of the legal issues 
surrrounding its creation, see Horsk.y and Mahin, The Operation of the Social Security 
Administration Hearing and Decisional Machinery 401-02 (1960) (mimeo) (hereinafter 
cited as Horsk.y Report). 
22. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Disability Termination Hearings at the Re­
consideration Level, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,831 (1983). 
23. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). The core Social Security Act provisions regarding "no­
tice and opportunity for a hearing" actually pre-dated by more than 10 years the Admin­
istrative Procedure Act, but as Robert G. Dixon, Jr. and others have pointed out, section 
205(b) of the Social Security Act is regarded as requiring an APA-appointed administra­
tive law judge to conduct the hearings required by that section. See R.G. DIXON, SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY AND MAss JUSTICE: A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION 146 
(1973). 
An interesting legal issue is whether SSA hearings are required to conform to the 
APA requirements, even assuming that the presiding officials must be APA-appointed 
administrative law judges. In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), the Supreme 
Court found it unnecessary to "decide whether the APA has general application to social 
security disability claims, for the social security administrative procedure does not vary 
from that prescribed by the APA. Indeed, the latter is modeled upon the Social Security 
Act." Id, at 409. However, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Margaret M. 
Heckler, in the preamble to the Department's regulations governing the Equal Access to 
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the claimant is still dissatisfied after receiving the administrative law 
judge's decision, he or she can request review by the Appeals Coun­
cil, SSA's highest administrative adjudicatory body. Finally, the 
claimant who is dissatisfied with the Appeals Council's decision can 
file a civil action in a United States district court under section 
205(g) of the Social Security Act.24 
Perhaps the most important statistical trend in disability adjudi­
cation under the Social Security Act is the almost steady increase 
since the mid-1960's of the proportion of claims allowed at the ad­
ministrative law judge hearing level as compared with the two state 
agency levels. The chart below, prepared by SSA's Office of Disabil­
ity, shows this trend for title II cases since 1965. This trend was cited 
repeatedly in legislative documents in the mid-1970's, when congres­
sional concern over actuarial deficits in the disability trust fund was 
especially strong.2S 
Justice Act (the EAJA), has stated that "adjudications of claims under the Social Security 
programs arc not covered [by the EAJA) because ... they are not 'required to be under .5 
u.s.c. .5.54' as required by § 13.3 [of the Secretary's EAJA regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 13.3 
(1983»." 48 Fed. Reg. 45,251 (1983) (emphasis added). 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981). There has been discussion over a number 
of years about the possibility ofeliminating district court jurisdiction over Social Security 
cases and instead establishing a spccializcd Article I Social Security Court. For an inter­
esting debate over both the proposal and the underlying problems with the judicial re­
view process, see Ogilvy, The Social Security Court Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. LEGIS. 229 
(1982); and Amer, The Social Security Court Proposal: An Answer to a Critique 10 J. 
LEGIS. 324 (1983). 
25. See, e.g., Delays in Social Security Appeals: 197.5 Hearings, supra note 9. In a 
backgound paper prepared by the Social Security Subcommittee staff, that report stated: 
The present "crisis" in the social security appeals process is linked to the tre­
mendous backlog of disability hearings and the resultant delay that benefi­
ciaries encounter in going through the process of exhausting their 
administrative remedies. . . . 
Equally important as speed of processing of cases, is the question of the quality 
of adjudication. The rate ofrnersal ofinitial denials ofdisability has become so 
substantial in recent years that ithos been citedby the Administration as one 0/the 
reasons/or the growing actuarial dejicit in the disabUity insurance system. 
Jd, at 8 (emphasis in original). See also LEGISLATIVE isSUE PAPER, supra note 9: "Over 
the years, the number of cases reversed on appeal has been increasing and the Social 
Security Administration has stated that reversals on appeal are playing a growing role in 
the actuarial deficiency in the disability insurance program." 
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III. SSA's EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARING 

SYSTEM: ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ITS WEAKNESSES 

A. The Systems Accomplishments 
The administrative law judge hearing component of SSA "is 
probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world."26 In 
fiscal year 1983, more than 360,000 requests for hearings before ad­
ministrative law judges were received by OHA.27 The disability pro­
grams administered by SSA, the Supreme Court has noted, "are of a 
size and extent difficult to comprehend."28 At the present time, more 
than two-thirds of the nearly 1200 administrative law judges in the 
federal government are employed by SSA. 29 
The brief for the government in Heckler Y. Day, 30 a case involv­
ing court-imposed time limits on the Social Security administrative 
law judge hearing process, which was recently argued before the 
Supreme Court, describes the strides made by SSA in meeting its 
extraordinary administrative law judge hearing workloads over the 
past decade. Total hearing requests grew from 72,000 in fiscal year 
1973 to more than 320,000 in fiscal year 1982. During this time pe­
riod, SSA increased the size of its administrative law judge corps 
from 420 to nearly 800, while more than doubling the number of 
support staff who assist the administrative law judges in the 130 local 
hearing offices nationwide. These and other initiatives allowed SSA 
to absorb a more than fourfold increase in its caseload without sub­
stantially increasing the average processing time of cases from the 
1973 level of 174 days.31 
If the administrative efficiency achieved by SSA's administra­
tive law judge hearing process is an important attribute of success in 
an adjudicatory system of this magnitude, so, too, is the perceived 
fairness of the appeals process among claimants and their represent­
26. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at xi. 
27. KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6. 
28. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971). 
29. See Skoler, The Clumging Role of Administrorive Low Judges: Time to Shfft 
Gears, 22 JUDGE'S J. 24, 27 (1983). Skoler's article includes a chart which illustrates the 
dramatic growth of the SSA administrative law judge corps and its eventual domination 
of the federal administrative law judge corps. In 1947, of the 196 administrative law 
judges government-wide, only thirteen, or 6.6 percent, were employed by SSA. By 1974, 
more than half of the 792 federal administrative law judges were employed by SSA. In 
January 1979,660 out of 1070 administrative law judges, or 61.7 percent, were employed
by SSA. In January 1983, 812 out ofa total of 1176 federal administrative law judges, or 
69.1 percent, were in the SSA administrative law judge corps. Id. 
30. No. 81-1983 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 1983). 
31. Brief for the Petitioner at 6-8, Heckler v. Do)'. 
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atives. "The headline," according to the CAl study, "is that claim­
ants generally perceive their hearings to be fair and adequate."32 
That report concludes that the administrative law judge hearing pro­
cess as it is presently administered in SSA is a useful means of mak­
ing the disability decisionmaking process "more acceptable" to 
claimants and beneficiaries who appeal adverse determinations.33 
Edwin Yourman, writing in 1975, acknowledged that the administra­
tive law judges employed by SSA were "able, conscientious and ef­
fective" in carrying out their statutory responsibilities.34 
These favorable, recent assessments of the effectiveness of SSA's 
administrative law judge hearing process appear to confirm that it 
has largely succeeded in accomplishing the mission set out for the 
hearing process by the original Social Security Board under Arthur 
J. Altmeyer in 1940, more than 15 years before the disability provi­
sions were added to the Social Security Act. In a report authored by 
Ralph F. Fuchs, the Board stated its expectation that the "value of 
the hearing process" in the original Old-Age and Survivors insur­
ance program would arise, first, from the claimant's ability in such a 
process "to state his contentions openly," and, second, from the abil­
ity of the hearing official to arrive at an independent judgment on 
the merits of the claim which had been denied at the lower level. 3S 
In his recent book on the overall SSA disability adjudication 
system, Mashaw concludes that the administrative law judge hearing 
process has allowed SSA to incorporate the advantages of individu­
alized attention to claimants while still efficiently processing ex­
tremely large numbers of claims at the initial and reconsideration 
levels.36 It is the administrative law judge hearing process, according 
to Mashaw, that has successfully fulfilled an essential humanizing 
32. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. 
33. Id at 28. 
34. Yourman, Report on Beneficiary Hearings, Appeals and Judicial Review 55 
(1975) (mimeo). 
35. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, BASIC PROVISIONS 
ADoPTED BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD FOR THE HEARING AND REVIEW OF OLD­
AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE CLAIMS, WITH A DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN ADMINIS­
TRATIVE PROBLEMS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 6 (1940) [hereinafter cited as the 
FUCHS REPORT). The Fuchs Report also gives an account of the "referees" the Board 
envisioned who would conduct the hearings, which interestingly docs not appear to differ 
significantly from today's administrative law judges: ''The desirability of a high type of 
personnel in the referees' positions is apparent. . . . Legal training and experience will 
be very valuable if not indispensible. Above all, the ability to inspire confidence, which 
is a product of personality and broad experience, is a prerequisite to successful function­
ing." Id at 41. 
36. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTIcE, supra note 12, at 214. 
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function in the process of adjucating disability claims within SSA.37 
It has done so despite remarkable increases in workloads and com­
plex program changes that could not have been foreseen by its de­
pression-era founders. 
B. The System's Weaknesses. 
1. The Problem of Delay 
Undoubtedly, the most widely discussed problem in the Social 
Security administrative law judge hearing process is the problem of 
delay. Countless hours of congressional committee time have been 
taken up with this question.38 So, too, has the time of the courts,39 in 
a series of class actions in which Social Security and SSI claimants 
have successfully obtained court-ordered time limits on the process­
ing of appeals,40 and, in many of these cases, the payment of interim 
benefits to claimants whose appeals are not decided in accordance 
with the time limits.41 
37. Mashaw postulates several "process values" to which any successful system of 
adjudication must attend, even if its decisions are always accurate. These include: 
"equality," "transparency," "participation," and "humaneness". Id at 88-97. Having 
served for many years as the first level where the claimant can meet face-to-face with a 
decisionmaker, the administrative law judge hearing process has clearly played a signifi­
cant role in actualizing some of these "process values." For example, Mashaw stresses 
the importance of the "transparency" of the decisionmaking process. He notes that 
Franz Kafka, whose novel, TIre Trial, spawned a new word ("kafkaesque") to describe 
non-transparent, alienating decisional processes, "gained many of his impressions of ad­
ministrative processes as a bureaucrat in an agency dispensing disability benefits." Id at 
91 n.9 (referring to F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (3d ed. 1956». The statutory guarantee of 
"reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing" provided to Social Security claimants 
in the form of an administrative law judge hearing has contributed immeasurably to the 
"transparency" of the decisionmaking process, writes Mashaw, especially in disability 
cases which by their nature involve sensitive, personal determinations about the effects of 
various medical impairments on the claimant's ability to work, and in which, before the 
recent introduction of the reconsideration-level hearing, there was no face-ta-face contact 
in the early stages of the decisionmaking process. Id. at 90-92. 
38. See, e.g. , J)elays in Social Security Appeals: 1975 Hearings, supra note 9. 
39. Most recently, the Unites States Supreme Court took up the issue in the case of 
Heckler v. Day, No. 81-1938 (argued Dec. 5, 1983). 
40. See Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978); Wright v. 
Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978); Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (lst Cir. 1978); 
Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978); and White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). See also, Note, Judicial Resolution ofSys­
temic J)elays in Social Security Hearings, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1979). 
41. One of the cases in which payment of interim benefits was part of the relief 
ordered by the court is Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19,21 (2d Cu. 1982), cert granted sub 
nom. Heckler v. Day, 103 S.Ct. 1873 (1983) (No. 81-1983). The issue was briefed by the 
parties in the Supreme Court and will presumably be addressed in the Court's forthcom­
ing decision. 
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As the government's brief in Day implicitly concedes, delay at 
the administrative law judge hearing level within SSA has been an 
intractable problem fOr over a decade.42 The claimant who today 
requests an administrative law judge hearing will wait an average of 
about 185 days for the issuance of a hearing decision.43 At the close 
of fiscal year 1983, nearly one-fifth of SSA's pending administrative 
law judge hearing cases were undecided after 180 days.44 Over 5,500 
cases had been pending for over 365 days.4s 
In Day, the lower courts found that processing times in excess of 
180 days constituted a violation of the statutory requirement for a 
"reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing."46 The gist of the 
government's argument before the Supreme Court in Day was that, 
in the absence of any findings of "bad faith or dilatory motive on the 
part of HHS,"47 the existing processing times "are such an en­
trenched feature-and direct and foreseeable consequence--of the 
conscientious implementation of the Social Security Act by Congress 
and the Secretary . . . that the normal processing period . . . is by 
definition 'reasonable' within the meaning of the statute."48 Still, the 
fact remains that average processing times in excess of six months in 
an administrative hearing process are extremely long, especially in 
light of the possibly destitute or near-destitute circumstances of 
many disability claimants. 
In a July 1974 report, the staff of the Committee on Ways and 
Means commented on this "appeals crisis" as follows: 
There is a substantial question as to whether the multitiered Social 
Security appeals procedure can withstand the current workloads 
under Social Security and SSI . . . . 
A Harrison Subcommittee admonition in 1960 seems still per­
tinent today. It stated, in answer to the Department's assertion 
that the many reviews and re-reviews of decisions were necessary 
to assure uniformity in the operation of a nationwide program, 
that the "question of whether a claimant becomes exhausted in the 
process of exhausting his administrative remedies is always a real 
one."49 
42. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
43. KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6. 
44. Id 
45. Id 
46. 42 U.S.c. § 405(b) (1981). 
47. Brief for the Petitioner at 38, Heclcler II. Do)'. 
48. Id at 33. 
49. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93d CONG., 1ST SESS., RE­
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2. 	 The Problem of Variations in Allowance Rates Among 
Administrative Law Judges 
Both the CAJ50 and the late Professor Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,51 in 
their respective analyses of the Social Security administrative law 
judge hearing process, remarked that its greatest weakness is the in­
consistency of results among individual administrative law judges. 
Both studies noted that administrative law judge production statis­
tics revealed extreme disparities among the administrative law 
judges in their reversal rates, not only nationally but also on a re­
gional basis and even in particular hearing offices. 52 Dixon termed 
this variation "striking and disturbing"53 in his analysis of 1971 data. 
Fiscal year 1983 data, as shown in the chart below, continue to show 
a large degree of inter-judge variance in allowance rates. 54 Thus, at 
the same time that "SSA has been able to absorb the more than four­
fold increase in its hearing caseload," as the government boasted in 
the Day brief,55 it has not succeeded in appreciably reducing the dis­
parity in case outcomes among the administrative law judges.56 
"One of the commonest definitions of an arbitrary adjudicatory 
system," Mashaw observes, "is one in which the person who decides 
a particular controversy is more important than the merits of the 
case."57 Moreover, according the CAJ study report, "[t]he evidence 
is persuasive that the inteIjudge dispersion in reversal rates is truly a 
product of subjective factors, probably relating primarily to the in­
terpretative role of the administrative law judge rather than the in-
PORT ON THE DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM 5 (Comm. Print 1974) (berinafter cited 
as 1974 CoMMITTEE STAFF REPORT). 
50. 	 CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 42. 
51. See, e.g., Delays in Social SecurilyAppeal.r: 1975 Hearings,supra note 9, at 117 
(statement of Professor Dixon). 
52. R.O. DIXON, supra note 23, at 76. The term "allowance rate" is probably more 
appropriate than the term "reversal rate," since an administrative law judge on an open 
record does not so much reverse the lower level decision as he or she docs allow the claim 
based on his or her own de novo review of the casco 
53. 	 Id at 76-77. 
54. SSA, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Division of Systems and Statistics (1984) 
(mimeo). 
55. 	 Su supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
56. 	 CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 42. 
57. 	 MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 73. 
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vestigative one."S8 That report concludes that "a claimant's success 
at the appeal stage is substantially affected by the identity of the pre­
siding [administrative law judge)." Thus, the wide variation in al­
lowance rates among SSA's administrative law judges, as Dixon 
emphasized, "raises questions of equal dispensation of justice."s9 
3. The Problem of Error-Prone Allowances 
"[I]t seems a priori," according to the CAl study report, "that 
objection to the mark.ed inteIjudge variance in reversal rates is more 
soundly based" than objection to "the frequency of [administrative 
law judge] reversal of state agency determinations," which "raises 
consistency issues that are at best problematic."60 Nevertheless, the 
current administrative law judge allowance rate, which is in excess of 
fifty-five percent, "not only fails to inspire confidence in the system," 
as Dixon wrote at a time when the allowance rate was less than fifty 
percent, "but encourages more requests for hearings because odds 
are so good."61 In its 1974 Report on the Disability Insurance Pro­
gram, the staff of the House Committee on Ways and Means wrote: 
Commentators on the program have pointed out that perserver­
anee in pushing an appeal may be the most important ingredient 
in success in the borderline cases and that Supreme Court Justice 
Blackmun's statement in the Perales case that a 44.2-percent hear­
ing examiner reversal rate attests to "the fairness of the system" 
does not fully reftect the unevenness that exists in the system.62 
Congressional concern over the high rate of allowances at the 
administrative law judge hearing level, coupled with the lack. of 
meaningful agency review of allowance decisions,63 culminated in 
an amendment to the Social Security Disability Amendments of 
1980, introduced by then-Senator Henry Bellmon on the floor of the 
58. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 21. 
59. R.G. DIXON, supra note 23, at 79. 
60. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 21. 
61. R.G. DIXON, supra note 23, at 40 
62. 1974 COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 5. 
63. The Social Security Subcommittee had criticized SSA for several years prior to 
enactment of the Bellmon Amendment because of SSA's failure to review administrative 
law judge allowance decisions. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER, 1976 supra note 9, 
at 31; DisahUity Insurance Program: Public Hearings Before tire House Suhcom. on Social 
Security of tire Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976); /)isahi/ity 
Insurance Legislation: Hearings Before tire House Suhcomm. on Social Security of the 
Comm. on Ways and Means on Proposals to Improve the DisahUity Insurance Program, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 223-24 (1979) (statement of Chairman Pickle). 
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Senate.64 In a 1982 report on the initial phase of the review,6S the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) noted that the 
amendment arose out of congressional concerns over the high-and 
growing- rate of allowances by administrative law judges.66 
The initial Bellmon report compared the Appeals Council's 
views on cases decided by administrative law judges with high, me­
dium and low allowance rates.67 The report found that the Appeals 
Council agreed with the allowance decisions of the medium and low 
allowance groups more than two-thirds of the time, but that the Ap­
peals Council agreed with the allowance decisions of the high-allow­
ance administrative law judges in only fifty-two percent of the cases. 
The report concluded that, taking the Appeals Council decision as 
"correct," it was clear that the most error-prone decisions were the 
allowance decisions of high-allowing administrative law judges.68 
Accordingly, HHS reported that an ongoing program of own-motion 
review under the Bellmon amendment was initiated on October I, 
1981, and that the focus of that review would be on administrative 
64. Act of Jan. 12, supra note I, § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 42 1 (h) (West 1983». 
65. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, iMPLEMENTATION OF SEC­
TION 304(G) OF PuBLIC LAW 96-265, "SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AMENDMENTS OF 
1980": REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1982) [hereinafter cited as BELLMON REPORT). 
''This report was prepared in response to the congressional requirement to initiate a re­
view of disability decisions at the hearing level and to report on that review." Id at 1. 
66. Id 
67. 	 The report divided the three groups as follows: 

AU AU 

AU Allowance Median 
Allowance Rate Group Percentage Allowance Rate 
Low Allowance Rate 0-55% 47% 

Medium Allowance Rate 56-70% 63% 

High Allowance Rate 71-100% 77% 

Id at 21. 
6S. Id at 23. These findings are consistent with those of a 1980 article by Deborah 
A. Chassman and Howard Rolston, former OHA employees who developed and oper­
ated the agency's first quality assurance system. See Chassman & Rolston, Social Secur­
ity Disability Hearings: A Case Study in Quality Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL 
L. REV. SOl (l9S0). In their article, Chassman and Rolston noted that: 
Simple statistical tests reveal that the error rate for sample cases of [administra­
tive law judges) with extremely high or extremely low allowance rates is higher 
than for other cases. This is particularly true for the allowance decisions of 
[administrative law judges) with high allowance rates. This suggests that in 
some instances the outcome of a claimant's case depends on the luck of the 
draw rather than the merits of the claim. Appeals CoW/cO review ofsucll cases 
would enhance tile fundamental fairness of tile system precisely wllere il lias 
deteriorated 
Id at SI8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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law judge allowance decisions.69 The review is conducted by the 
Appeals Council under its longstanding authority to review any ad­
ministrative law judge decision on its own motion.70 
Data generated by this ongoing own-motion review by the Ap­
peals Council suggest not only that high-allowance administrative 
law judges as a group are more error-prone than their peers, but also 
that allowance decisions themselves are more error-prone than de­
nial decisions at the administrative law judge hearing level. This 
conclusion is reached by comparing the rate at which the Appeals 
Council exercises its own-motion review authority in cases where the 
administrative law judge has allowed benefits with the rate at which 
the Council grants review at the request of claimants who have re­
ceived unfavorable administrative law judge decisions.71 During 
fiscal year 1983, own-motion review was taken in over seventeen per­
cent of the cases considered by the Council under the Bellmon 
amendment,72 as compared with a grant-review rate of only 8.6 per­
cent in cases where claimants appealed unfavorable administrative 
law judge decisions.73 These data confirm the impression long held 
69. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 23. The focus of the ongoing Bellmon 
review on the decisions of administrative law judges with high allowance rates was chal­
lenged by administrative law judges as an infringement of their decisional independence 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Association of Administrative Law Judges in 
the Department of Health and Human Services, Inc. v. Schweiker, No. 83-124 (D. D.C. 
filed Jan. 19, 1983) (Judge Joyce Hens Grccn presiding). Judge Grccn's decision was 
pending as this article went to press. 
70. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 30. 
71. The regulatory criteria governing Appeals Council determinations as to 
whether or not to review an administrative law judge decision are identical for own­
motion review and claimant-initiated review. See Cases the Appeals Council Will Re­
view, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970,416.1470 (1983). Thus, assuming the Council applies these 
criteria impartially, it is appropriate to compare oWD-motion rates for allowance deci­
sions with grant-review rates for denial decisions to arrive at an approximation of the 
relative error-proneness of the two types of decisions. It is important to note that, when 
the Appeals Council either grants a claimant's request for review or reviews a case on its 
own motion, that action alone docs not constitute a reversal of the administrative law 
judge's decision. For example, in fiscal year 1983, the Council vacated the administrative 
law judge's decision and remanded in nearly 5,000 cases and reversed the administrative 
law judges in approximately 4,500 other cases. OHA OPERATIONAL REPORT, FY 1983, 
supra note 6. 
72. SSA, Office of Hearings and AppcaIs. Office of Appraisal: Report on Quality 
Review, FY 83 Update (1984). 
73. KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6. Even if one assumes some partial­
ity on the part of the Appeals Council towards finding fault with allowance decisions 
during this time, perhaps in reaction to the Bellmon Amendment's implicit criticism of 
the Council's failure to exercise its own-motion authority for a number of years prior to 
the 1980 amendments, the difference betwccn the oWD-motion and grant-review rates 
appears to be too great to be attributed entirely to such a bias. 
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by the state agencies and others that administrative law judges as a 
group tend to err on the side of allowances.74 
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF THE "OPEN FILE" CONCEPT TO THE 

PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 

HEARING PROCESS 

At the suggestion of Congress, SSA's report on the initial imple­
mentation of the Bellmon review considered the effect of additional 
evidence submitted at the administrative law judge hearing level. In 
this portion of the study, a group of administrative law judges was 
asked to review the same 1,000 cases that had previously been re­
viewed by another group of administrative law judges, except that 
the cases in the second review were stripped of any evidence which 
had been submitted after the reconsideration level. The study found 
that the administrative law judges who reviewed the cases without 
the added evidence would have allowed almost fifty percent fewer 
cases than were allowed by the administrative law judges who had 
reviewed the same cases with the additional evidence. In the great 
majority of the cases, the additional evidence related to a medical 
condition that had been alleged by the claimant and considered by 
the decisionmaker at the lower level, not to a new or worsened con­
dition. The study concluded that "additional evidence submitted af­
ter the [state agency] reconsideration decision ... made a significant 
difference in [administrative law judge] allowance rates."7S 
74. ''The system encourages (the administrative law judges) to be Robin Hoods 
and give away the king's deer." MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 73 
(quoting STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., DISA­
BILITY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER 35 (1976». 
75. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 27. The Report explains this phase of the 
study as follows: 
The third phase of the initial review was designed to determine the effect on 
(administrative law judge) decisions of additional evidence submitted after the 
(state agency) reconsideration decision. . . . Each case was revised to remove 
any evidence added after the (state agency) reconsideration decision. The case 
folders, stripped of all information gathered in the hearings process, were dis­
tributed to another representative group of 48 (administrative law judges) for a 
complete readjudication. . . . The differences in decisions on these 1,000 
cases-adjudicated both with (in the second phase of the study) and without (in 
the third phase) post-reconsideration evidence-should be, in the aggregate, at­
tributable to the submission of additional evidence after the reconsideration 
level. 
... (A)dditional evidence made a significant difference in (administrative law 
judge) allowance rates. The overall second phase allowance rate of 46 percent 
dropped to 31 percent when all additional evidence was removed. . . . 
Id. 
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This portion of the Bellmon study clearly suggests that new evi­
dence about pre-existing medical conditions has a profound impact 
on administrative law judge allowance rates. Moreover, the CAl 
study in 1978 found "great variation in [individual administrative 
law judge] development effort."76 Taken together, the results of both 
studies indicate, first, that individual idiosyncrasies among adminis­
trative law judges with regard to the development of new evidence is 
an important factor in the wide variation in their individual allow­
ance rates, and, second, that the admission by administrative law 
judges of new evidence not available at the state agency levels is a 
major cause of the high overall administrative law judge allowance 
rate. 
The link between the open file concept and the three problems 
of delay, discrepancies in outcome, and high allowance rates at the 
administrative law judge hearing level, then, is rather clear. First, 
the admission of new evidence by administrative law judges, 
whether because of their own development efforts or because of sub­
mittal by claimants and their representatives, appears to be responsi­
ble for a great many of the administrative law judge reversals of 
lower level. denials. Except where the new evidence pertains to a 
new or worsening condition, which the Bellmon report suggests is 
not all that common, the allowance of a claim by an administrative 
law judge on the basis of new evidence would presumably be unnec­
essary had the lower-:-Ievel decisionmaker had the opportunity to 
consider that same evidence. By raising the odds of an allowance on 
appeal, the open file in tum encourages appeals and contributes to 
the problem of backlogs and delays in the appeals process. Finally, 
different approaches by individual administrative law judges to the 
task of case development at their level appear to be responsible for a 
fairly substantial amount of the variation in individual administra­
tive law judge allowance rates. 
V. THE "CLOSED RECORD" ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

JUDGE HEARING 

A. Origins ofthe Concept 
On Friday, September 19, 1975, the Subcommittee on Social Se­
curity held one of a series of hearings on the subject of "delays in 
Social Security appeals." During that hearing, Representative 
Archer of Texas asked a panel of expert witnesses whether, if they 
76. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 52. 
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were "starting from scratch," they would design the disability ap­
peals process in its present form, or whether a different approach 
might yield more just and equitable results, not just for claimants but 
for contributors to the trust fund as well.77 
One month later, in the same series of hearings, Mr. Archer sug­
gested an answer to his earlier question in a question he asked then­
SSA Commissioner Cardwell regarding the Commissioner's opinion 
about a suggestion "to close the record" at some point in the process. 
"Some people from Texas said this would get rid of a big, big share 
of the problem," said Mr. Archer.78 "In a way," responded Commis­
sioner Cardwell, "the answer we would give to your question if we 
were starting from scratch dovetails with that very question."79 
Cardwell acknowledged that the existing "open record arrangement" 
produced marked inconsistencies from level to level within the ap­
peals process, and that ''these judgments are going in every 
direction."SO 
Representative Conable joined the colloquy at this point, and it 
continued as follows: 
Mr. Conable: Hyou are going to close the record, you will have 
to be careful about what gets into the record. 
The reason you keep the record open is to protect 
a process that is not all that carefully constructed, 
really. 
Mr. Cardwell: I agree. I think it puts an added burden on the 
thoroughness and efficiency of the basic adjudica­
tion of claims, and this would have to be 
examined. 
Mr. Archer: But you cannot expect the decision at the lower 
level to be in conformity with the decisions as 
you go up the ladder of appeals, if you are deal­
ing with different facts. 
77. Delays in Social Security Appeals: 197.5 Hearings, supra note 9, at 155. Unfor­
tunately, the record shows that a recess was called just after Mr. Archer asked his ques­
tion, before the panel could respond. After the recess, Representative Steiger said, "We 
were anxiously awaiting the answer to Bill Archer's thought-provoking questions." Id. 
The responses, however, went off on the issue of federal versus state disability determina­
tion units rather than the basic: structure of the appeals process which seems to have been 
at the root of Mr. Archer's question. See ill. 
78. Id at 531. 
79. Id 
80. Id 
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Mr. Cardwell: That is right. The facts keep changing in the 
present system, and very often you have an initial 
determination at what appears to be the final 
hearing process, because that hearing officer will 
be hearing facts that no one else has had an 
opportunity to consider. 
Mr. Archer: If the initial decision is not based on all of the 
facts, then there is something lacking. 
We should not have any decisions not based on 
all of the available facts, and it just seems to me 
this may be the key to solving a lot of the prob­
lem. 
If the initial process does not bring into focus all 
of the facts, then we are not doing our job under 
the law because there are a lot of people who do 
not appeal, who are being subjected to a decision, 
where all of the facts are not present. 
We want to do justice to all ofthe people covered 
by these laws. But once there is an opportunity for 
all of the facts to come in, it seems to me a very 
strong argument could be made that the record 
ought to be closed at some point, so you do not 
have to continue to embellish and add to this rec­
ord. As long as you do, it seems to me no mailer 
what other steps we take, we will have this tremen­
dous d!lference between the decisions that are ren­
dered at a higher level, and the decisions rendered 
at a lower level 81 
B. 'Closed Record" Legislation 
In the 1980 Amendments, Congress took an initial step in the 
direction advocated by Mr. Archer by amending the Social Security 
Act to provide that an application for benefits is valid only if the 
claimant "satisfies the requirements for such benefits" as of the date 
of the adminjstrative law judge hearing decision, at the latest.82 AI­
81. Id at 531-32. (emphasis added). 
82. Social Security Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 306,94 Stat. 
441,457 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 405 (1976 &; Supp. V 1981». Paragraph (2) now 
reads: 
An application for any monthly benefits under this section filed before the first 
month in which the applicant satisfies the requirements for such benefits shall 
be deemed a valid application (and shall be deemed to have been filed in such 
first month) only if the applicant satisfies the requirements for such benefits 
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most three years later, SSA published proposed regulations to imple­
ment that provision. The preamble to the proposed regulations 
explained that Congress, in enacting the provision, had given the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to limit the 
Appeals Council's review of administrative law judge decisions to 
the evidence that had been considered by the administrative law 
judge.83 
On May 26, 1982, the House Ways and Means Committee ap­
proved a bill which took even more decisive action to curtail the 
open file concept in Social Security disability claims adjudication. 
The bill, entitled "Disability Amendments of 1982," was intended, 
among other things, "to strengthen the reconsideration process by 
providing for the earlier introduction of evidence, [and] to provide 
for more uniformity in decisionmaking at all levels of adjudica­
tion."84 The Committee Report described the existing disability ap­
peals process, in which "cases have been able to be taken up 'de 
novo' at each administrative level," and noted that the 1980 amend­
ments had taken a "first step. . . to reform this process by 'closing 
the record' at the [administrative law judge] level." Citing its con­
cern over "the deliberate withholding" of "available evidence from 
treating physicians and specialists consulted independently by claim­
ants" until they reached the administrative law judge hearing level,85 
the Committee approved a two-part reform particularly aimed at im­
proving the reconsideration level of the appeals process. The bill 
provided, first, for a face-to-face hearing at the reconsideration level 
(much like the procedure later established by P.L. 97-455), and, sec­
ond, a "modified closed record requirement"86 under which new evi­
dence of a previously alleged impairment would not be admissible at 
the administrative law judge hearing level, but would instead be re­
manded to the reconsideration level. 87 
before the Secretary makes a final decision on the application and no request 
under section 205(b) for notice and opportunity for a hearing thereon is made 
or, if such a request is made, before a decision based upon the evidence ad­
duced at the hearing is made (regardless of whether such decision becomes the 
final decision of the Secretary). 
83. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,968 (1983). As of the date of this writing, final regulations to 
implement this provision have not been issued. 
84. DISABILITY AMENDMENTS, supra note 14, at 1. 
85. Id at 11. 
86. Id 
87. Id at 12. The bill "modified" a more stringent closed-record requirement 
which had been introduced by Representatives Pickle and Archer in H.R. 5700. Section 
5 of that bill would have provided simply that "[n)o documentary evidence submitted on 
or after the date of a decision on reconsideration . . . shall be considered in connection 
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"The amendment," the Committee explained, "was purposely 
designed to get attorneys and other representatives to proffer rele­
vant and available material which is essential to a decision on the 
best evidence at reconsideration."88 A dozen members of the Com­
mittee, however, took issue with the approach adopted by the Com­
mittee majority. In their "Separate Views," published with the 
Committee's report on the bill, these members wrote: 
Making the reconsideration level a more meaningful step in the 
disability determination process is a sound goal. To the extent 
that cases are resolved at this stage, the system will be improved. 
Closing the record at this stage, however, as Section 5 would do, is 
an unfair and inefficient means of improving the process at the 
State level. The whole purpose of the hearing by an Administra­
tive Law Judge is to provide an independent check and balance to 
executive discretion under the law. If the hearing before the Ad­
ministrative Law Judge is to have an)' meaning at all, the individ­
ual's (sic] appealing the State agency decision must be aI/owed to 
present all of their evidence. 89 
As it turned out, the 97th Congress did not act on the Ways and 
Means Committee bill. Instead, in response to a growing public out­
cry over the number ofterminations resulting from the 1980 Amend­
ments, Congress enacted the provisions of P.L. 97-455, reqtiliing 
reconsideration hearings and permitting benefit continuation 
through the administrative law judge hearing level in disability ter­
mination cases. The major reforms, as Mr. Pickle said, were left for 
"next year." Neither the full Ways and Means Committee nor the 
Social Security Subcommittee has since then resurrected the discus­
sion of whether the face-to-face reconsideration hearing should be 
the last de novo stage in the Social Security appeals process, thereby 
making the administrative law judge hearing a "closed record" 
proceeding.9O 
with entitlement to benefits ...." Id. Besides adding the requirement that the closed 
record would apply only when the claimant had had an opportunity for an evidentiary 
hearing at the reconsideration level, the bill approved by the full Ways and Means Com­
mittee also permitted the administrative law judge to admit "evidence of new and wors­
ening conditions." Id. Further, the Committee's bill also included "[a] specific provision 
. . . requiring both written and oral notice to the claimant that it was essential to get 
available evidence into the record at reconsideration and that the individual might wish 
to obtain an attorney or other representative." It/. 
88. It/. 
89. It/. at 82. (emphasis added). 
90. In late 1983, the Ways and Means Committee reported out a bill entitled "So­
cial Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1983." HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND 
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VI. 	 THE NEED FOR A "CLOSED RECORD" FOLLOWING THE 
LOWER-LEVEL EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Several observations can be made about the relationship of the 
various statistical trends and problems in the Social Security disabil­
ity appeals process. It is clear, first of all, that as the proportion of 
allowances which occurs at the administrative law judge level has 
mushroomed from less than five percent in the mid-1960's to roughly 
one-third in the early 1980's, so, too, has the number of appeals and 
the resulting problem of case backlogs and delays. It is also clear 
that the open file concept plays an important, if indeterminate, role 
in the large number of allowances which occur on appeal. Finally, 
the decisionmaking process as it is presently structured appears to 
tend towards erroneous denials (or "false negative" decisions) at the 
lower level (due to lack of complete development) but towards erro­
neous allowances (or "false positive" decisions) at the administrative 
law judge hearing level. 
Reforms are obviously needed which will, first, allow the disa-
MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP.. No. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) 
(hereinafter TAX REFORM ACT OF 1983). The Committee Report noted: 
The disability insurance program has attracted substantial Congressional atten­
tion over the last two years, primarily because of the numbers of beneficiaries 
whose benefits have been terminated. The review of current beneficiaries that 
has produced these terminations was mandated by Congress, but was acceler­
ated in pace in March, 1981. There has been no suggestion that those receiving 
disability benefits should never be examined again, but the committee believes 
that the process over the last several years has resulted in erroneous termination 
of benefits for at least some people. . . . The overall purpose of the bill is, first, 
to clarify statutory guidelines for the determination process to insure that no 
beneficiary loses eligibility for benefits as a result of careless or arbitrary deci­
sion-making by the Federal government. Second, the bill is intended to provide 
a more humane and understandable application and appeal process for disabil­
ity applicants and beneficiaries appealing termination of their benefits. Finally, 
the bill seeks to standardize the Social Security Administration's policy-making 
procedures through the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative 
Procedures [sic] Act, and to make those procedures conform with the standard 
practices of Federal law, through acquiescence in Federal Court of Appeals 
rulings. 
Id at 410. The major provision of the bill with regard to the structure of the decision­
making process was to eliminate the reconsideration level as it is now known and require 
face-ta-face hearings in the state agencies at the initial determination stage in benefit 
termination cases. The bill also required SSA ''to initiate demonstration projects with 
respect to face-to-face evidentiary meetings at the initial level of state agency determina­
tions for new applicants. . . ." Id at 423. The bill was silent on the issue of closing the 
record following the first face-ta-face hearing stage. On March 27, 1984, the House of 
Representatives passed the bill by the extraordinary vote of 410 to 1. 130 CONO. REC. 
HI956-93. The Senate had not yet acted on any comparable legislation as this article 
went to press. 
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bility adjudication process to do a better job of distinguishing eligi­
ble from ineligible claims at the early decisional stages, and, second, 
make it less likely to have the lower-level determination reversed on 
appeal. To the extent that face-to-face contact will help bring about 
the first of these improvements, the new reconsideration level hear­
ings should greatly reduce the incidence of "false negatives" in state 
agency decisions in the termination cases in which the new proce­
dure will be available.91 The latter improvement, however, is un­
likely under the existing open file system, notwithstanding any 
improvements in the lower-level decisionmaking process.92 
"Very few reforms will improve all dimensions of the process at 
once," cautioned the CAl study report. "Every change requires a 
trade-off among relevant values."93 The change to a more personal­
ized lower level determination, as a result of the new face-to-face 
reconsideration process, itself represents a compromise between a 
concern over the fairness and quality of the lower-level decisions 
and the need for speedy and economical adjudication of vast num­
bers of cases. In enacting P.L. 97-455, Congress has clearly deter­
mined that, at least with respect to termination cases, it is worth the 
time, expense, and administrative difficulty involved in providing in­
dividualized hearings, to require such a procedure at an early stage 
of the process. 
The change from the present open file system to an appeals pro­
91. In a congressional hearing in June 1983, a Social Security Administration offi­
cial reported that, in a pilot test of the new face-to-face reconsideration procedure, the 
reconsideration allowance rate was thirty-eight percent. Social Security Disability Insur­
ance: Hearing Before tile SulJcommittee on Social Security oftile Committee on Ways and 
Means. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st Scss_ 69 (1983). The statement was 
made by then-Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals Louis B. Hays in re­
sponse to a question from Subcommittee Chairman Pickle. This is in stark contrast to 
the usual reconsideration allowance rate of twenty percent or less by the state agencies. 
KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6. These data confirm Mashaw's expectation 
that, in response to a face-to-face encounter with a claimant, ''the number of claims 
granted by state agencies should go up." MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 
12, at 199. 
92. It is far from certain, for example, that a lower proportion of administrative 
law judge allowances will occur in the cases which are not favorably reconsidered as a 
result of the face-to-face hearing. The danger implicit in the somewhat experimental use 
of an evidentiary hearing process at the reconsideration level in termination cases is that 
it will simply result in a greater overall number of allowances. It is conceivable, in other 
words, that the greater latitude given the state agency hearing officer under the new pro­
cess (as compared with the lesser discretion given the normal state agency claims exam­
iner under the old process) will result in a higher reconsideration allowance rate but that 
administrative law judges will continue to allow roughly sixty percent of the cases they 
receive. 
93. CAl STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at xix. 
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cess with a more restricted right to submit new evidence to an ad­
ministrative law judge, as the 1982 Ways and Means Committee bill 
required, would likewise involve a trade-off. In this instance, the 
trade-off would be a reduction in inter- as well as intra-stage incon­
sistency in case outcomes, resulting in a speedier and less congested 
appeals process, as against a lesser opportunity for the claimant to 
prove his or her case on appeal, which could erode the perceived 
fairness of the process. 
The 1982 Ways and Means bill struck what appears to have 
been a reasonable balance among these various considerations by 
]jnking the reconsideration hearing with a closed record requirement 
for the subsequent levels of the appeals process. The trade-off in the 
bill was that, in return for a much-improved opportunity to present 
one's case at the reconsideration level, any further appeals would 
have to be taken solely on the basis of the case record as it was per­
fected at the lower level. Experience would suggest that, by severing 
the reconsideration hearing from the closed record requirement, as it 
did in P.L. 97-455, Congress has set the stage for an actuarial ''worst 
case" scenario: an increased tendency towards allowances at the 
lower level with no corresponding decrease in allowances by the ad­
ministrative law judges. Thus, if, as many commentators would sug­
gest, SSA extends the face-to-face reconsideration hearing to non­
termination cases, the disability trust fund deficiencies of the mid­
1970's might well return to haunt both SSA and the Congress in the 
mid-1980's. 
VII. 	 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A "CLOSED RECORD" 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARING 
Perhaps the strongest argument against a closed record adminis­
trative law judge hearing is that on its face it seems contradictory to 
speak of an evidentiary hearing at which the decisionmaker is fore­
closed from admitting new evidence which is apparently relevant in 
deciding the case. In his Administrative Law Treatise, 94 Professor 
Davis analyzes the development of the law with regard to adminis­
trative hearing processes, but nowhere does the question of a closed 
record hearing arise. At both a theoretical and a practical level, the 
idea of such a hearing seems anamolous. What would be left to dis­
cuss at such a hearing? Recalling that the question at issue would be 
the ability of the claimant to work in spite of his or her medical 
impairments, would any purpose even be served by the claimant's 
94. K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1918). 
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attendance, assuming that the administrative law judge could not go 
beyond the evidentiary record developed below? Or would it suffice 
for the claimant's counsel to submit written arguments and make a 
brief oral argument? In short, would not the administrative law 
judge hearing quickly become anachronistic and merely repetitive of 
the paper-review type of process which now occurs at the Appeals 
Council level? 
These questions suggest the potential complexity underlying 
any proposal to "close the record." Obviously, there are many possi­
ble gradations between a de novo hearing on a completely open rec­
ord, and a totally closed-record hearing where, in effect, only legal 
issues would be open for discussion. The 1982 Ways and Means 
Committee bill explicitly exempted from the closed record require­
ment evidence pertaining to new or worsening medical impairments. 
Other exemptions, such as evidence deduced by careful questioning 
of the claimant as to his or her daily habits, were arguably implicit in 
that legislation. The target of the bill appears to have been documen­
tary evidence which was, or could have been, available at the recon­
sideration level which is either consciously or unconsciously 
withheld by the claimant until the administrative law judge hearing. 
Although the exact extent of this phenomenon is unknown, the Sec­
retary's Bellmon report indicates that, whatever its extent, the intro­
duction of new documentary evidence at the administrative law 
judge hearing level does have a profound impact on case outcomes.95 
An integral aspect of the closed record requirement in the 1982 
legislation was an apparently liberal remand authority, whereby the 
administrative law judges could direct that an imperfectly developed 
record be more thoroughly worked up by the state staff.96 Presuma­
bly, in any case remanded by the administrative law judge the state 
would have to provide an opportunity for further face-to-face hear­
ing before returning the case to the administrative law judge for de­
cision. (Cases favorably disposed of by the state agency on remand 
might, of course, simply be processed for payment without going 
back up to the administrative law judge.) Perhaps to prevent abuse, 
the state agencies could be authorized to ask for Appeals Council 
review of remand orders they believe to be unnecessary or excessive. 
But a liberal remand authority would appear to be necessary to pre­
95. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
96. According to the Committee Report. the bill required that "if the claimant 
wished [this newly offered) material to be part of the record •... the case be remanded to 
the reconsideration level. ..." H.R. REp. No. 588. 97th Congo 2d Sess. 12 (1982). 
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serve the fairness of the system. Thus, a case could be returned by 
the administrative law judge to the state agency for further develop­
ment or an additional reconsideration-level hearing, not only when 
the administrative law judge perceives a deficiency in the record as it 
was developed below but also when the claimant asks to admit new 
evidence into the record at the administrative law judge hearing. 
It should be emphasized that a closed record would not fore­
close the administrative law judge from making an independent 
judgment on the facts of the case. He or she would not, in other 
words, be limited to reversing only those lower level decisions which 
were not supported by substantial evidence, as are the federal district 
courts under section 20S(g) of the Social Security Act.97 Thus, the 
claimant's in-person appearance and credibility would retain much 
of their present importance in the administrative law judge hearing 
and decisionmaking process. It would be a mistake, therefore, to as­
sume that the restrictions imposed by a closed record on the claim­
ant's ability to submit new evidence to the administrative law judie 
would deprive the administrative law judge hearing process of its 
vitality and significance in the eyes of claimants and their 
representatives. 
Finally, it would appear that, from an administrative stand­
point, the closed record could shift a considerable workload from the 
administrative law judges and their staffs to the state agencies, since 
there would no longer be a need for extensive case development at 
the administrative law judge hearing level. This would presumably 
help to offset some of the large administrative costs likely to be re­
quired to provide individualized hearings at the reconsideration 
level. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Ways and Means Committee members who submitted sep­
arate views on the closed record provision ofH.R. 6181 in 1982 sug­
gested that "some mistakes and omissions are going to be made at 
the State level," due in part to the fact that few claimants have repre­
sentation at that level and in part to simple error by "[o]verworked 
and underfinanced State agencies." "By allowing the record to re­
main open to additional evidence through the [administrative law 
judge] hearing," they concluded, "tragic mistakes can be avoided."98 
The problem with the closed record requirement, they believed, was 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981). 
98. Id at 81. 
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that it would cure the problems in the system by making it more 
difficult for beneficiaries to contest a termination of benefits. "Re­
stricting the right to appeal the decision made by the State agency" 
they reasoned, "is not the way to improve the system at the State 
level."99 
In the wake of the justifiable public concern over the large 
number of apparently erroneous disability benefit terminations 
under the 1980 amendments, it is difficult to take issue with a cau­
tious or even skeptical view of the ability of the state agencies to 
produce accurate, fair, replicable decisions on the disability claims 
sent to them by SSA for either a first-time decision or a later review. 
On this score, the dissenters on the Ways and Means Committee in 
1982 would appear to be today's majority. But the underlying 
problems with the disability appeals process, as exemplified by the 
problems of delay, variance and the tendency towards erroneous al­
lowances at the administrative law judge hearing level, remain, and 
require serious corrective action on the part of Congress. 
Although not wholly free from doubt as to its workability and 
fairness, the idea of a closed record administrative law judge hearing 
after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing at the reconsideration 
level clearly has the potential for improving the consistency and 
replicability of decisionmaking not only at the administrative law 
judge hearing level but also in the state agencies. Once the reconsid­
eration-level hearing process is fully operational and has any "bugs" 
worked out (conservatively, that might be at the end of calendar year 
1984), it would be reasonable to implement the closed record system 
on a trial basis. 1oo To do so would be entirely consistent with the 
pledge made by the original Social Security Board that a continual 
effort be made to "preserve an attitude of self-criticism" and to im­
prove the SSA hearing process on the basis of operational 
99. Id at 82. 
100. The closed record provisions of H.R. 6181 were limited to benefit termination 
cases, in which the reconsideration-level hearing would have been (and, under Pub. L. 
No. 97-455, is) required. "This provision in the bill will provide a real test as to the 
effectiveness and fairness of a face-ta-face reconsideration and the closing of the record, 
and if it proves successful it could, over time, be extended to the reconsideration process 
of initial claims," according to the Committee Report. H .R. REp. No. 588, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. 13 (1982). Arguably, termination cases are not an appropriate place to begin 
testing the effectiveness and fairness of the closed record administrative law judge hear­
ing, since a beneficiary who faces termination of benefits is likely to be particularly trau­
matized by that prospect and may require more, not less, consideration than a person 
applying for benefits for the first time. A more appropriate approach might be to extend 
the face-ta-face hearing requirement to new application cases and then test the closed 
record in those cases before using it in termination cases. 
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101. FUCHS REPORT, supra note 35, at 43. 
